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Agreement Protocols on an Arbitrary Network in
the Presence of a Mobile Adversary
Chris Dowden∗
Abstract
We investigate the problem of obtaining agreement protocols in the
presence of a mobile adversary, who can control an ever-changing selection
of processors. We make improvements to previous results for the case
when the communications network forms a complete graph, and also adapt
these to the general case when the network is not complete.
1 Introduction
Suppose various processors in a network wish to reach agreement on a partic-
ular decision. Unfortunately, some unknown subset of these may be under the
control of a malicious adversary who desires to prevent such an agreement being
possible.
To this end, the adversary will instruct his ‘faulty’ processors to provide
inaccurate information to the non-faulty processors in an attempt to mislead
them. The aim is to construct an ‘agreement protocol’ that will always foil the
adversary and enable the non-faulty processors to reach agreement successfully
(perhaps after several rounds of communication).
In traditional agreement problems, it is usually assumed that the set of
faulty processors is ‘static’, in the sense that it is chosen by the adversary at
the start of the process and then remains fixed throughout all communication
rounds. In this paper, we shall instead focus on the case of a ‘mobile’ adversary,
who can continually change his selection of faulty processors. We assume that
the communication links between processors are always perfectly reliable, and
cannot themselves be controlled by the adversary.
This mobile problem was previously investigated in [9], for the particular
scenario of a complete communications network, and a successful protocol was
given for the case when the total number of processors n and the number of
mobile faulty processors m satisfy n > 18m. We shall improve on that bound,
as well as generalising our results to the non-complete case.
∗Author’s Note: The original version of this work was wriiten in 2012. For more up-to-date
results, see for example ‘Tight Bound on Mobile Byzantine Agreement’ by Bonnet, De´fago,
Nguyen and Potop-Butucaru.
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In the remainder of this section, we describe the basic set-up, and summarise
the static case. In Section 2, we then introduce the mobile version, and provide
details of relevant results; in Section 3, we present a new algorithm for the
specific scenario of mobile adversaries on a complete network, and reduce the
n > 18m requirement to just n > 6m; in Section 4, we investigate how to
adapt this procedure to arbitrary networks; and in Section 5, we consequently
derive conditions in terms of the vertex-connectivity and minimum degree of
such networks.
1.1 Formulation of the problem
Throughout this paper, we shall consider the situation where there are n proces-
sors (i.e. vertices) connected by a network of links (i.e. edges) enabling pairwise
communication, but where some of the processors are faulty. We assume that
the communication links themselves are always perfectly reliable.
Crucially, the exact identity of the faulty processors is not known, but the
overall aim is for the non-faulty processors to nevertheless reach some sort of
‘agreement’ about a particular decision, by adhering to a pre-determined pro-
tocol.
In this paper, we shall concentrate on the ‘Byzantine Agreement’ (BA) for-
mulation of the agreement problem. Here, a known source processor s (which
may or may not be one of the faulty ones) is supposed to transmit a value vs
over all its communication links. If s is non-faulty then it will indeed follow
these instructions, but if s is faulty then it could send anything — in particular,
it might send different values to different processors.
All the processors (including s) are then permitted to communicate with
each other over the network for as long as they desire — note that the faulty
processors will use this as an opportunity to spread inaccurate information.
The aim is for the non-faulty processors to eventually reach agreement about
the value of vs — we shall define the exact form that this agreement must take
later.
We shall assume throughout that all processors, faulty and non-faulty, are
always completely synchronised. Hence, each ‘communication round’ will consist
of (i) all processors simultaneously sending out various messages to adjacent
processors, and then (ii) each processor receiving the messages sent to it during
that round.
Note that we shall also always assume a ‘non-authenticated’ environment,
where the faulty processors can relay information incorrectly, rather than the
‘authenticated’ version, where the faulty processors can merely refuse to pass
on information.
1.2 The static adversary
In this subsection, we shall describe the standard ‘static’ case, where the set of
faulty processors is chosen by the adversary at the start of the process and then
remains fixed.
2
Recall that we are concentrating on the BA formulation of the agreement
problem, where the source processor s starts with a value vs.
In the static case, a successful protocol should eventually terminate with the
non-faulty processors having reached an agreement about the value of vs that
satisfies the following two conditions:
(BA1) every non-faulty processor must agree on a common value v′s;
(BA2) if the source processor is non-faulty, then v′s must be the correct value vs.
The basic case, first studied in [8], is when the communications network
forms a complete graph (meaning that every pair of processors can communicate
directly), and when the adversary can control any m of the n processors, for
some fixed m ≤ n − 2. We assume that the value of m is common knowledge,
but that the specific identity of the controlled processors is known only to the
adversary.
In this setting, it is known that it is then possible to construct a successful
agreement protocol for the BA problem if and only if n > 3m (see [8] for a clever
constructive proof by induction on m, which essentially works by demonstrating
that if there is much contradictory information then s must be faulty, in which
case the induction hypothesis can be used on the remaining processors).
In the non-complete case, some processors will not be able to communicate
directly with one another, and will instead have to go through third parties.
In particular, this means that any message sent by processor p to processor q
will take at least d(p, q) communication rounds to reach its destination, where
d(p, q) denotes the distance between p and q, and may be tampered with along
the way.
However, it is simple to observe (as in [4], for example) that every pair of
processors can still communicate effectively as long as the network is 2m + 1
vertex-connected (simply transmit any desired message along 2m+1 pre-agreed
vertex-disjoint paths — the majority of these messages will arrive unaltered).
Consequently, it is possible to construct a successful agreement protocol if and
only if n > 3m and the network is 2m+ 1 vertex-connected.
In addition to Byzantine agreement, there are also two other common formu-
lations of the agreement problem — ‘consensus’ and ‘interactive consistency’.
The definitions differ in terms of the initial set-up and the form of the final
agreement, but it can be shown that all three formulations are actually equiv-
alent, in the sense that a protocol to solve any one of the problems can be
modified into protocols to also solve the other two.
2 Introduction to the mobile adversary
In the previous subsection, we outlined some results for the case of a static ad-
versary. In this section, we shall now start to instead explore the concept of a
mobile adversary, which is to be the focus of this paper. In Subsection 2.1, we
provide a brief introduction; in Subsection 2.2, we state the assumed communi-
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cation procedure; in Subsection 2.3, we shall look at one way to formulate the
problem, which results in no successful protocols being possible; and in Sub-
section 2.4, we discuss a more promising approach. In Subsection 2.5, we also
outline a few miscellaneous results.
Existing results on mobile adversaries seem to concentrate on the case when
the communications network is complete. In Section 3, we shall present a new
algorithm for this case, before moving on to general networks in Sections 4
and 5.
Let us re-iterate here that we are concerned with an adversary who can
control processors, but not communication links. There is already a substantial
body of work (see, for example, [10], [11] and the references therein) dealing
with the problem of mobile link faults, but this is not of direct relevance to us.
2.1 Introduction
In contrast to the static case considered in the previous section, we shall now
allow the adversary to change his m selected processors at the start of each
new communication round. In particular, there is to be no bound on the total
number of processors that may be affected at some stage during the process.
There are various different ways that the basic Byzantine agreement problem
can then be re-stated. For example, the precise formulation will depend on issues
such as who exactly is required to reach agreement (should it be all processors
who are non-faulty at that particular moment or just all processors who have
never been faulty? — we shall discuss this in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4) and to
what extent (if any) the adversary is allowed to tamper with the memory of a
faulty processor.
In terms of the latter issue, one option that appears natural, and which we
shall henceforth choose, is to allow the adversary unlimited ability to rewrite
any data stored by the processors currently under its control (note that this
means that even after a processor is deselected, it will still retain potentially
inaccurate information stored by the adversary), including any data recorded
prior to becoming faulty.
Of course, we shall also still assume that when under the control of the
adversary, a processor may completely disregard the pre-determined protocol
— in particular, by sending inaccurate and inconsistent messages to the other
processors. However, we shall suppose that the protocol itself is stored safely
and cannot be tampered with. Consequently, if deselected by the adversary, a
processor will then return to following the correct protocol again (albeit possibly
with inaccurate data stored by the adversary).
Throughout the rest of this paper, we shall use the term ‘faulty’ to refer to
the m processors which are currently under the control of the adversary, and
‘non-faulty’ to refer to the other n − m processors, including any which have
been controlled previously.
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2.2 The communication procedure
We shall assume that each communication round proceeds as follows:
Step 1: The adversary chooses which m processors to control during this round
(he will not be able to change his selection again until the start of the next
round); each processor starts the round with the stored information that it has
collated during previous rounds (if the processor was controlled at some point
by the adversary, then some of this information may be incorrect);
Step 2: Each non-faulty processor sends out messages to all adjacent proces-
sors, based on the state of its stored information and the instructions of the
protocol; the processors that are currently under the control of the adversary
may send out anything in their messages;
Step 3: Every processor receives the messages that were sent to it during Step 2;
Step 4: Each non-faulty processor updates its stored information according to
the instructions of the protocol, to take into account the messages sent and
received in Steps 2 and 3; the adversary may store incorrect information on the
processors currently under its control, and may even maliciously rewrite infor-
mation that was already stored.
A successful protocol should eventually terminate (after some pre-determined
fixed number of rounds, independent of the actions of the adversary) with the
relevant processors having reached a suitable agreement (see Subsections 2.3
and 2.4 for the precise requirements).
2.3 Impossibly strong agreement requirements
Recall that we are concentrating on the BA formulation of the agreement prob-
lem, where the source processor s starts with a value vs. As already noted,
there are different possibilities for how to rephrase BA1 and BA2 in the case
of a mobile adversary. In this subsection, we shall look at what happens if we
require that the agreement must satisfy the following two conditions:
(MBA1) every processor which is non-faulty in the final round must agree on a
common value v′s;
(MBA2) if the source processor has never been faulty, then v′s must be the cor-
rect source value vs.
Unfortunately, (a version of) this problem was examined in [7], and it was
observed that it is actually impossible to construct a successful protocol that
always satisfies these two conditions, even when the communications network is
complete and m = 1!:
Theorem 1 (rephrased from [7], Proposition 1) Let m ≥ 1 denote the
number of mobile faulty processors in each communication round, and let n >
m+1 denote the total number of processors. Then it is impossible to construct a
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protocol for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agreement that always satisfies
conditions MBA1 and MBA2.
The proof is based on work in [5] and [6], and involves making a series of mi-
nor modifications to the behaviour of faulty processors in intermediate rounds,
working back earlier and earlier without changing the value of the final agree-
ment until eventually vs itself is altered and condition MBA2 is contradicted. A
crucial ingredient is the fact that MBA1 implies that all processors non-faulty in
the final round need to agree even if each was faulty in an intermediate round.
2.4 Weaker agreement requirements
Due to the impossibility result of Theorem 1, it is more interesting to look at
what happens if condition MBA1 is weakened to just require agreement from all
processors that are never faulty (with condition MBA2 remaining the same), i.e.:
(MBA1′) every processor which has never been faulty must agree on a com-
mon value v′s;
(MBA2) if the source processor has never been faulty, then v′s must be the cor-
rect source value vs.
With these weaker agreement requirements, a successful protocol for the
case when the network is complete and n > 18m then follows as a corollary
to the following detailed result of Reischuk ([9]), where rounds are grouped in
‘intervals’ of three:
Theorem 2 ([9], Theorem 1) Let the network be complete, let n denote the
total number of processors, let p1, p2, . . . , pn denote the processors themselves,
with p1 being the source processor s, and let t <
n
6 . Suppose that (i) in each
3-round interval, at most t processors are faulty in at least one of these rounds,
and (ii) there exists R such that processor pR is non-faulty in rounds 2R and
2R+ 1.
Then there exists a protocol for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agree-
ment containing a special round r∗ ≤ 2R+ 3 for which (a) all processors which
are non-faulty in both rounds r∗ − 1 and r∗ will have set the same value of v′s
by round r∗ and will not change it as long as they stay non-faulty, and (b) if
processor pi is non-faulty in both rounds r
∗ − 1 and r∗ and the source processor
is non-faulty in round 1, then pi’s value of v
′
s at round r
∗ will be the correct
source value vs.
Corollary 3 Let the network be complete, let m denote the number of mobile
faulty processors in each communication round, and let n > 18m denote the
total number of processors. Then there exists a protocol for non-authenticated
mobile Byzantine agreement that always satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2.
Proof Observe that requirement MBA1′ is vacuous unless there exists a pro-
cessor pR that is always non-faulty, and hence we may apply Theorem 2 with
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t = 3m.
As an aside, note that Theorem 2 actually provides a successful protocol
even if we strengthen condition MBA2 to require that v′s = vs whenever s is
non-faulty in round 1, rather than just whenever s is always non-faulty.
One of the main difficulties with agreement problems is the fact that one
processor may believe that the support for a particular value of v′s is just above a
given threshold, while another processor receiving slightly different information
may instead think that the amount of support is just below the threshold.
Reischuk’s successful protocol gets around this issue by instead introducing two
separate threshold levels, essentially classifying the degree of support into ‘high’,
‘medium’ or ‘low’. The crucial ingredient in the protocol is the role then played
by a special processor (whose identity changes every two rounds), which uses
its own view of the degree of support to encourage all ‘medium’ classifications
to crystallise into either ‘high’ or ‘low’, thus enabling a decision to be reached.
In Section 3, we shall present a refined version of Reischuk’s protocol, and
improve on the bounds given by Theorem 2/Corollary 3. In Sections 4 and 5,
we shall then adapt this protocol to the case of non-complete networks.
2.5 Alternative formulations
Various other slightly different formulations of the mobile adversary agreement
problem have also been discussed, again concentrating on the case when the
network is complete.
In [1] and [7], it is assumed that any processor changing from faulty to non-
faulty will immediately know that it was previously faulty. In this setting, a
successful protocol is given in [1] for n > 4m.
In [2], a version of the problem is investigated under the additional assump-
tion that no new processors can fail before recovered processors have successfully
learned the current state of computation. With this modification, it is observed
that successful protocols are possible for n > 3m.
In [3], a slightly different formulation of the problem is proposed, where the
adversary chooses his selection of faulty processors between Step 2 and Step
3, instead of during Step 1. Crucially, this means that any processor released
from the control of the adversary is able to receive and then send out messages
before it can be put under the control of the adversary again. Here, a successful
protocol is given for n > 3m.
3 Complete networks
In this section, we now present new results for the formulation of the problem
outlined in Subsection 2.4, for the specific case when the network is complete. In
Subsection 3.1, we refine Reischuk’s protocol; in Subsection 3.2, we use this to
improve the n > 18m result of Corollary 3 to just n > 6m; and in Subsection 3.3,
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we observe that n > 5m is certainly necessary. In the remainder of the paper,
we shall then look at generalising our results to non-complete networks.
3.1 The protocol
The protocol is based on Reischuk’s ([9]), with each processor pi using two sets
Ai and Bi to contain the set of possible values of vs that he believes to have
‘high’ or ‘medium’ support from the other processors. In terms of improving
the results of Theorem 2 and Corollary 3, the crucial modification that we make
is for pi to continue transmitting information about Ai and Bi to the other
processors even after setting his value of v′s, thus enabling the other processors
to gain extra information.
Additionally, in order to cut down on the amount of data that is transmitted
in each communication round (and hence reduce time and cost), we introduce
two new values ⊥0 and ⊥2 for the cases when the sets Ai and Bi have size zero
or size at least two, and we consequently modify the protocol so that it is just
two values ai and bi that are transmitted by each processor, rather than the
entire sets Ai and Bi.
To simplify some of the expressions in this new version of the protocol, and
the subsequent proof, we also alter the definition of Bi so that it is always a
superset of Ai, rather than being disjoint, and we allow both Ai and Bi to
contain the value ⊥2 (but not the value ⊥0).
Without loss of generality, we denote the n processors by p1, p2, . . . , pn, where
the source processor s is p1.
As mentioned, the protocol presented here is for the case when the network
is complete. The non-complete case will be discussed in Sections 4 and 5.
ROUND 1
Transmission: The source processor s = p1 sends vs to all processors (includ-
ing himself).
Setting al and bl: Each processor pl then sets both al and bl to be equal
to the purported value of vs that he has just received from the source proces-
sor (the values of al and bl will be modified at the end of each subsequent round).
ROUND r, FOR r ∈ {2,3, . . . ,2n}
Transmission: Each processor pi sends the current values of ai and bi to all
processors (including himself).
Setting/resetting v′
s
: Let aij and bij denote the values received by proces-
sor pj from processor pi. In the event that all but at most 2m of the values
a1l, a2l, . . . , anl are equal to a common value a, processor pl sets/resets his value
of v′s to be a. Otherwise, he leaves his value of v
′
s unset/unchanged.
Setting/resetting Al and Bl: Let f(r) = ⌊
r
2⌋+ 1. For l 6= f(r), processor pl
sets/resets Al so that x ∈ Al if and only if x 6= ⊥0 and either
(a) af(r)l = x and bjl ∈ {x,⊥2} for strictly more than 4m values of j in total
or (b) ajl = x for strictly more than 4m values of j in total;
and he sets/resets Bl so that x ∈ Bl if and only if x 6= ⊥0 and either
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(a) af(r)l = x and bjl ∈ {x,⊥2} for strictly more than 2m values of j in total
or (b) ajl = x for strictly more than 2m values of j in total.
The ‘special’ processor pf(r) sets/resets Af(r) so that x ∈ Af(r) if and only
if x 6= ⊥0 and either
(a) af(r)f(r) = x and bjf(r) ∈ {x,⊥2} for strictly more than 3m values of j in
total
or (b) ajf(r) = x for strictly more than 3m values of j in total;
and he sets/resets Bf(r) to be equal to this new Af(r).
Resetting al and bl: Each processor pl (including the case l = f(r)) resets al
and bl so that
al =


x if Al = {x} (including the case when x = ⊥2)
⊥0 if |Al| = 0
⊥2 if |Al| ≥ 2
and bl =


x if Bl = {x} (including the case when x = ⊥2)
⊥0 if |Bl| = 0
⊥2 if |Bl| ≥ 2.
TERMINATION
The protocol terminates after 2n rounds.
3.2 Sufficiency of n > 6m
We shall now present properties of the protocol defined in Subsection 3.1, im-
proving on Theroem 2 and Corollary 3.
Theorem 4 Let the network be complete, let m denote the number of mobile
faulty processors in each communication round, let n > 6m denote the total
number of processors, and let p1, p2, . . . , pn denote the processors themselves,
with p1 being the source processor s. Suppose that there exists R such that
processor pR is non-faulty in both rounds 2R− 2 and 2R− 1 (the round 2R− 2
condition can be ignored if R = 1).
Then the protocol for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agreement defined
in Subsection 3.1 operates such that for every round r ≥ 2R (a) all processors
which are non-faulty in round r will have a common value for v′s at the end
of that round and (b) if the source processor is non-faulty in round 1 (i.e. if
R = 1), then this value of v′s will always be the correct source value vs.
Proof First, consider the case when the source processor s = p1 is non-faulty
in round 1 (i.e. R = 1). Recall that every processor pi which is non-faulty in
round 1 will hence set ai = vs and bi = vs. It can then be observed inductively
that in each subsequent round r ≥ 2, each processor pj which is non-faulty in
both rounds r − 1 and r will send aj = vs and bj = vs, and (since there are
at least n− 2m of those) each processor pk which is non-faulty in round r will
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consequently set v′s to be vs, set both Ak and Bk to be {vs}, and set both ak
and bk to be vs.
Now consider the case when the source processor s = p1 is faulty in round
1, but when there exists a processor pR (for some R ≥ 2) which is non-faulty in
both rounds 2R− 2 and 2R− 1.
Claim 5 Suppose that there exists a processor pR, for some R ≥ 2, which is
non-faulty in both rounds 2R− 2 and 2R− 1. Then there exists a∗ such that, at
the end of round 2R− 1, every processor pi which is non-faulty in round 2R− 1
will set ai = a
∗ and bi = a
∗.
It follows from the claim that all but at most 2m processors will send (a∗, a∗)
in round 2R, and so all non-faulty processors in round 2R will certainly set
v′s = a
∗. It can then again be observed inductively that in each subsequent
round r ≥ 2R, each processor pj which is non-faulty in both rounds r − 1 and
r will send aj = a
∗ and bj = a
∗, and (since there are at least n− 2m of those)
each processor pk which is non-faulty in round r will consequently set v
′
s to be
a∗, set Ak and Bk so that
Ak = Bk = {a∗} if a∗ /∈ {⊥0,⊥2}
Ak = Bk = ∅ if a∗ = ⊥0
Bk ⊃ Ak ⊃ {⊥2} if a∗ = ⊥2,
and set both ak and bk to be a
∗.
Proof of Claim The proof will follow from a careful consideration of the
workings of the protocol in rounds 2R − 2 and 2R − 1, utilising the fact that
f(2R− 2) = f(2R− 1) = R. To avoid confusion about the changing state of the
various sets and values in these different rounds, we will now use Arl to denote
the state of Al at the end of round r, and we define B
r
l , a
r
l and b
r
l analogously.
First, observe that only at most m of the messages received by any two
processors in any given round can differ, and recall that f(2R−2) = f(2R−1) =
R. It then follows from the definitions in the protocol that, for each processor pk
which is non-faulty in round 2R−2, we have A2R−2k ⊂ A
2R−2
R = B
2R−2
R ⊂ B
2R−2
k
(note that these sets are well-defined, since 2R− 2 ≥ 2).
If |A2R−2R | = 0, we thus have a
2R−2
R = ⊥0 and a
2R−2
k = ⊥0. Hence, in
round 2R − 1, processor pR will send aR = ⊥0, and each processor pj which
is non-faulty in both rounds 2R − 2 and 2R − 1 (there are at least n − 2m of
these in total, including pR) will send aj = ⊥0. Thus, each processor pi which
is non-faulty in round 2R − 1 will consequently set both A2R−1i and B
2R−1
i to
be ∅, and hence set both a2R−1i and b
2R−1
i to be ⊥0.
If A2R−2R = {x} (here we include the possibility that x = ⊥2), then a
2R−2
R =
x, a2R−2k ∈ {⊥0, x} and b
2R−2
k ∈ {x,⊥2}. Hence, in round 2R − 1, we obtain
A2R−1i = B
2R−1
i = {x}, and consequently a
2R−1
i = b
2R−1
i = x.
Finally, if |A2R−2R | ≥ 2, then a
2R−2
R = b
2R−2
R = b
2R−2
k = ⊥2. Hence, in
round 2R − 1, we obtain ⊥2 ∈ A
2R−1
i and ⊥2 ∈ B
2R−1
i , and consequently
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a2R−1i = b
2R−1
i = ⊥2.
The proof of the claim completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 6 Let the network be complete, let m denote the number of mobile
faulty processors in each communication round, and let n > 6m denote the
total number of processors. Then the protocol defined in Subsection 3.1 always
satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine
agreement.
Proof Recall that requirement MBA1′ is vacuous unless there exists a processor
pR that is always non-faulty.
Note that in certain circumstances, e.g. if there exists a processor that is
always non-faulty, Theorem 4 implies that the protocol works even if we require
that all processors non-faulty in the final round need to agree, as in MBA1
(note that this does not contradict Theorem 1, since such circumstances may
not arise).
3.3 Necessity of n > 5m
We have just seen that conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 can be satisfied if n >
6m. Conversely, we shall finish this section by now showing that it is certainly
necessary to have at least n > 5m:
Theorem 7 Let m ≥ 1 denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each
communication round, and let n > m+1 denote the total number of processors.
Then if n ≤ 5m, it is impossible to construct a protocol for non-authenticated
mobile Byzantine agreement that always satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2.
Proof Let us divide the n processors into five sets each having size at most m,
and let us denote these sets by S, A, B, C and D, with the source processor
s ∈ S (we may assume that A ∪B and C ∪D are both non-empty).
Firstly, imagine that the adversary selects the set S in every round, and
that the processors in S always tell those in A ∪B that vs = 0, but always tell
those in C ∪ D that vs = 1. To satisfy condition MBA1′, it will consequently
be necessary for processors in A ∪ B to agree with processors in C ∪ D on a
common value, but it won’t matter what that value is.
Secondly, now consider the separate case when vs = 1 and when the adver-
sary repeatedly selects the sets A and B alternately (A in the first communica-
tion round, B in the second round, A in the third round, etc.). Observe that,
by storing false information, it is possible for the adversary to guarantee that
the messages from processors in A∪B to processors in C ∪D will always be so
as to suggest that vs = 0 (this is possible because, in each round, one of A and
B will be under the control of the adversary, while the processors in the other
will be accidentally relaying false information stored by the adversary in the
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previous round). To satisfy conditions MBA1′ and MBA2, it will be necessary
for processors in C ∪ D to agree on a common value, and for that to be the
correct source value vs = 1.
Crucially, note that it will be impossible for the processors in C ∪D to be
able to distinguish between the two cases. Hence, these processors will be forced
to decide on the value 1 in the first scenario as well as in the second. By using
a symmetrical example to the second case, it can similarly be shown that the
processors in A ∪ B will be forced to decide on the value 0. Hence, agreement
will not be reached.
We are left with just a small gap remaining between the necessary and
sufficient conditions.
4 Arbitrary networks — the key theorem
We shall now consider the case when the network of processors is an arbitrary
graph (i.e. not necessarily complete), starting in Subsection 4.1 with an ob-
servation concerning the impossibility of successful protocols when the vertex-
connectivity is small.
Recall (from Subsection 1.2) that the non-complete case for static adversaries
can easily be reduced to the complete case, provided that the network has suf-
ficient connectivity to guarantee that reliable communications are still possible.
In Subsection 4.2, we present a key analogous result for mobile adversaries.
In Section 5, we shall then use this approach to deduce detailed results
phrased in terms of the minimum degree and vertex-connectivity of the network.
4.1 An impossibility result
Theorem 8 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each com-
munication round, and suppose the network contains a cut-set of size at most
4m that doesn’t contain the source processor s. Then it is impossible to con-
struct a protocol for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agreement that always
satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2.
Proof Let G denote the network and let X denote the given cut-set. Let us
divide X into four disjoint sets A, B, C and D of size at most m each, and
let p be an arbitrary processor that is in a different component to the source
processor s in the graphG\X . Thus, all messages from s to pmust pass through
processors in either A ∪B or C ∪D.
First, let us consider the scenario where the adversary selects the set A in
every odd-numbered round and then the set B in every even-numbered round.
Hence, in each round, one of A and B will be actively under the control of the
adversary, while the other will be relaying information stored by the adversary
in the previous round. Thus, it will be possible that A ∪B will always act as if
vs = 1 and C ∪D are faulty.
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Similarly, if vs = 1 and the sets C and D are selected alternately, it will be
possible that C ∪D will always act as if vs = 0 and A ∪B are faulty.
In order to satisfy condition MBA2 (since both s and p are always non-
faulty), it will be necessary for p to somehow determine the correct source value
vs in both cases. However, since the two scenarios will appear identical to p,
this will clearly be impossible.
4.2 The key theorem
In this subsection, we shall now present a detailed result (Theorem 9) which es-
sentially reduces the remaining problem to one of constructing reliable commu-
nication throughout the network. We also provide (in Corollary 10) a simplified
version of this same result.
In order that we may use the framework of the protocol given in Subsec-
tion 1.2, we shall find it helpful if we parameterise communication systems in
terms of T , the amount of time taken for a message to reach its destination re-
liably, and K, the amount of time that the sender and recipient need to remain
non-faulty (e.g. for the complete network case, T = K = 1).
We start with the full theorem:
Theorem 9 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each com-
munication round, let n denote the total number of processors, and let p1, p2, . . . , pn
denote the processors themselves, with p1 being the source processor s.
Suppose that there exist T and K such that, for all processors pi and pj
(including the case i = j), perfectly reliable one-way communication from pi to
pj in exactly T communication rounds is achievable whenever pi is non-faulty
throughout the first K of these rounds and pj is non-faulty throughout the last
K of these rounds.
Suppose furthermore that
(i) K < n6m ;
and (ii) there exists a value R such that processor pR is non-faulty in all rounds
from (2R−2)T−K+1 to (2R−2)T+K inclusive (the rounds (2R−2)T−K+1
to (2R− 2)T should be ignored if R = 1).
Then there exists a protocol for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agree-
ment such that for every r ≥ 2R
(a) all processors which are non-faulty during all rounds from rT −K+1 to rT
inclusive will have a common value for v′s at the end of round rT and will not
change it unless they become faulty;
and (b) if the source processor is non-faulty during all rounds from 1 to K in-
clusive (i.e. if R = 1), then this value of v′s will always be the correct source
value vs.
Proof Note that at most mK senders can be faulty at some stage during the
first K rounds of a communication procedure, and that at most mK receivers
can be faulty at some stage during the last K rounds of such a procedure.
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The proof consequently follows from a careful examination of the protocol
and proof for complete networks given in Section 3. We use the exact struc-
ture of that protocol, but with every communication round now replaced by T
rounds and with the role of m replaced by mK.
If we are just interested in satisfying MBA1′ and MBA2, then we may omit
some of the details from the statement of the theorem and obtain the following
simplified version:
Corollary 10 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each
communication round, let n denote the total number of processors, and let
p1, p2, . . . , pn denote the processors themselves.
Suppose that there exist T and K such that, for all processors pi and pj
(including the case i = j), perfectly reliable one-way communication from pi to
pj in exactly T communication rounds is achievable whenever pi is non-faulty
throughout the first K of these rounds and pj is non-faulty throughout the last
K of these rounds.
Then if K < n6m , there exists a protocol that always satisfies conditions
MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agreement.
Proof Recall that condition MBA1′ is vacuous unless there exists a processor
pR that is always non-faulty, and so we may assume that condition (ii) in Theo-
rem 9 is satisfied. Thus, we attain outcomes (a) and (b) from Theorem 9, which
are sufficient to guarantee the fulfillment of MBA1′ and MBA2 at the end of
round 2nT .
It now suffices to construct a communication system satisfying the conditions
of Theorem 9/Corollary 10, and this will consequently be the focus of Section 5.
5 Applications of the key theorem
In the previous section, we reduced the agreement problem to one of obtaining
a system of reliable communication. In this section, we shall now construct
suitable communications procedures, consequently obtaining conditions for the
existence of successful protocols in terms of the minimum degree and vertex-
connectivity of the network. In Subsection 5.1, we derive a tight sufficient
bound of δ > n2 + 2m − 1 on the minimum degree (see Theorem 12); and in
Subsection 5.2, we obtain a sufficient condition of κ ≥ 10m on the vertex-
connectivity (see Corollary 16).
5.1 Results in terms of the minimum degree
In this subsection, we shall use transmissions through paths of length two to
construct a method for reliable communication (Lemma 11), and consequently
obtain a successful agreement protocol (Theorem 12). This will all be phrased in
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terms of the minimum degree of the network, but we shall note (in Corollary 13)
that this also immediately implies results in terms of the vertex-connectivity.
We start with our result on reliable communication, which satisfies the con-
dition required in Theorem 9/Corollary 10 by taking T = 2 and K = 1.
Lemma 11 Let δ denote the minimum degree of the network, let m denote
the number of mobile faulty processors in each communication round, and let n
denote the total number of processors. Then if δ > n2 +2m− 1, perfectly reliable
one-way communication from any processor u to any processor v is achievable
in exactly 2 communication rounds as long as u is non-faulty in the first of these
rounds and v is non-faulty in the second.
Proof Note firstly that the case u = v is trivial, since the conditions then imply
that u is non-faulty in both rounds, and so he can simply store any desired
message to himself in his memory without fear of it being tampered with. In
the rest of the proof, we shall deal with the case u 6= v.
Let d(u) and d(v), respectively, denote the degrees of u and v, and observe
that we have d(u) + d(v) ≥ n + 4m − 1. This inequality immediately implies
that u and v must have at least 4m − 1 neighbours in common. Furthermore,
if u and v are not themselves neighbours, then (since the size of the union of
the neighbourhoods of u and v can then only be at most n − 2) the inequality
implies that u and v must actually have at least 4m+1 neighbours in common.
We may consequently always send a message from u to v through 4m + 1
different routes: if u and v are not neighbours, then we send the message along
4m + 1 pre-agreed paths of length 2; if u and v are neighbours, then we send
the message along 4m− 1 pre-agreed paths of length 2, and also directly from
u to v in round 1 (i.e. the ‘path’ uvv) and directly from u to v again in round
2 (i.e. the ‘path’ uuv).
If u is non-faulty in round 1 and v is non-faulty in round 2, then since the
intermediary nodes are all distinct, it can then be observed that only at most
2m of the 4m + 1 transmissions may be disrupted (at most m in each round),
and so v can simply use ‘majority vote’ to obtain the correct message.
As an aside, we note that the proof of Lemma 11 actually only requires that
any pair of processors have at least 4m + 1 common neighbours (or 4m − 1
common neighbours if the pair are themselves adjacent), rather than that δ >
n
2 + 2m− 1.
Lemma 11 and Theorem 9/Corollary 10 may now be combined to provide a
successful agreement protocol. For simplicity, we present the result in an anal-
ogous form to Corollary 10, although a more detailed result akin to Theorem 9
could also be obtained.
Theorem 12 Let δ denote the minimum degree of the network, let m denote
the number of mobile faulty processors in each communication round, and let
n > 6m denote the total number of processors. Then if δ > n2 + 2m− 1, there
exists a protocol satisfying conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated
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mobile Byzantine agreement. Furthermore, this bound is optimal, in the sense
that there exist networks with δ = n2 + 2m − 1 for which no such protocol is
possible.
Proof The existence of a successful protocol when δ > n2 +2m− 1 follows from
Lemma 11 and Corollary 10.
To see that this bound is optimal, simply consider the network formed by
taking two complete graphs each of order n2 − 2m, selecting the source pro-
cessor from amongst these, and then adding in 4m extra processors that are
joined to everything. It can be observed that the constructed network will have
δ = n2 +2m− 1, but also that the extra processors will form a cut-set of size 4m
and hence (by Theorem 8) that no successful protocol is possible.
Since the minimum degree of the network is certainly always at least the
vertex-connectivity, we immediately obtain the following corollary to Theo-
rem 12:
Corollary 13 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each
communication round, let n > 6m denote the total number of processors, and
let κ > n2 + 2m − 1 denote the vertex-connectivity of the network. Then there
exists a protocol satisfying conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated
mobile Byzantine agreement.
Note that Theorem 12 also shows that there exist networks with vertex-
connectivity only 4m + 1 for which successful protocols can be constructed
(consider the network formed by taking two complete graphs of order n−4m−12
and then adding in 4m+ 1 extra vertices that are joined to everything), and so
the bound of Theorem 8 cannot be improved.
We shall produce further results in terms of the vertex-connectivity in the
next subsection.
5.2 Results in terms of the vertex-connectivity
At the end of the previous subsection, we made some observations concern-
ing successful agreement protocols in terms of κ, the vertex-connectivity of the
network. In this subsection, we shall now introduce a brand new method for
reliable communication (in Lemma 14), and then utilise Corollary 10 to conse-
quently obtain further results (Theorem 15 and Corollary 16) for the attainment
of agreement protocols when κ is sufficiently large. We shall then also provide
a result (Corollary 17) phrased for the case when the number of mobile faults
is a specific proportion of the total number of processors.
We start with our new system for reliable communication, which satisfies
the condition required in Theorem 9/Corollary 10 by taking K = T − 1:
Lemma 14 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each com-
munication round, let n denote the total number of processors, let κ > 4m de-
note the vertex-connectivity of the network, and let T = ⌈n−1−4m
κ−4m ⌉ > 1 (i.e. the
network is not complete).
16
Suppose that processor u is non-faulty throughout communication rounds 1
to T − 1, and that processor v is non-faulty throughout communication rounds
2 to T . Then perfectly reliable one-way communication from u to v may be
achieved in exactly T rounds.
Proof Again, we note that the case u = v is trivial, and so we may assume
u 6= v.
If T = 2, then n − 1 − 4m ≤ 2(κ − 4m), which corresponds exactly to
κ ≥ n2 + 2m−
1
2 . Thus, we certainly must have δ ≥
n
2 + 2m−
1
2 , and so we are
done, by Lemma 11.
Now let us consider the case T ≥ 3. If u and v are neighbours, then they
can simply exchange the message reliably in round 2, so we shall assume instead
that all paths from u to v have length at least 2.
By Menger’s Theorem, we know that there exists a set of κ vertex-disjoint
paths from u to v (we may assume that these are pre-agreed upon). For all
rounds from 1 to T − 1, inclusive, let u send the message along all κ of these
paths (hence, if a given path has length l, messages sent along that path will be
received by v from round l onwards, and some may not reach v by time T ).
Observe that u sends the message κ(T − 1) times in total (T − 1 times along
each path), and note that at most n− 2−κ of these transmissions will not have
had time to reach v by the end of round T (this follows from observing that the
points reached by such transmissions will all be distinct processors, and will not
be u or v or the first vertex in any of the κ paths). Hence, v will receive at least
κT − n+ 2 transmissions in total.
When an intermediate node is faulty in a particular round, this will affect
both the message that it sends in that round and also the message that it stores
(and then sends in the following round). Hence, since there will be mT times
that processors will be faulty, and since we may ignore transmission faults in
round 1 and storage faults in round T , the total number of messages that can
be disrupted by the adversary is 2mT −m−m = 2m(T − 1).
We shall now observe that processor v may then use ‘majority vote’ to de-
termine the correct message — it only remains to show that the number of
disrupted messages is less than half the total number received, i.e. 2m(T − 1) <
κT−n+2
2 . But this is exactly equivalent to T >
n−2−4m
κ−4m , and so T = ⌈
n−1−4m
κ−4m ⌉
is certainly sufficient.
The following result now follows immediately from Lemma 14 and Corol-
lary 10 (again, we also note that further details can be derived via Theorem 9
if desired):
Theorem 15 Let the network be non-complete, let m denote the number of
mobile faulty processors in each communication round, let n denote the total
number of processors, and let κ > 4m denote the vertex-connectivity of the net-
work. Then if ⌈n−1−4m
κ−4m ⌉ − 1 <
n
6m , there exists a protocol that always satisfies
conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agree-
ment.
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We may also simplify Theorem 15 to obtain the following bound:
Corollary 16 Let the network be non-complete, let m denote the number of
mobile faulty processors in each communication round, let n denote the total
number of processors, and let κ > 4m denote the vertex-connectivity of the
network. Then if κ ≥ 10m − 24m
2
n
− 6m
n
, there exists a protocol that always
satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for non-authenticated mobile Byzantine
agreement.
Proof In order to satisfy ⌈n−1−4m
κ−4m ⌉−1 <
n
6m , it suffices if
n−1−4m
κ−4m ≤
n
6m , which
is exactly equivalent to κ ≥ 10m− 24m
2
n
− 6m
n
.
Finally, we may also deduce our aforementioned result for the case when
n
m
= A:
Corollary 17 Let m denote the number of mobile faulty processors in each
communication round, let n = Am denote the total number of processors (for
some A > 6), and let κ denote the vertex-connectivity of the network. Then if
κ ≥
{
(A2 + 2)m if 6 < A ≤ 12
(10− 24
A
)m if A ≥ 12,
there exists a protocol that always satisfies conditions MBA1′ and MBA2 for
non-authenticated mobile Byzantine agreement.
Proof The A ≥ 12 part of the result follows from Corollary 16 (note that the
κ > 4m condition is irrelevant here), while the A ≤ 12 part follows from Corol-
lary 13.
Note that this bound on κ will be close to 5m when A is close to 6, and will
never exceed 10m.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have investigated the topic of agreement protocols in the pres-
ence of a mobile adversary, looking at both the case when the communications
network is complete and when it is not complete.
For the former, we obtained results (in Section 3) in terms of n, the total
number of processors, andm, the number of mobile faulty processors, producing
a successful protocol for the case when n > 6m and showing that n > 5m is
certainly necessary. For the latter, we derived (in Sections 4 and 5) a tight bound
of δ > n2 + 2m − 1 for a sufficient minimum degree, and showed that vertex-
connectivity κ ≥ 10m is also sufficient, while κ > 4m is certainly necessary.
It would be interesting to see whether the remaining gap between the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions in the complete case can be closed. Similarly,
it would be nice to obtain a tight result for the non-complete case in terms of
the vertex-connectivity. In particular, do there exist any networks with vertex-
connectivity greater than 4m for which agreement protocols are not possible?
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